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What are we doing when we are training? 
 
Amateur and professional sportspersons, Bernard Suits proposed, are 
differentiated by their attitude towards their sport. For the amateur, competition is 
a game done for its own sake; while for the professional, it is a game, but it is one 
that is done for a further reason. It follows that in competing, amateurs are 
playing, while professionals are working. But what should one say about the 
training that both amateur and professional do in preparation for competition? 
Competition is an athletic game which can be engaged in as play or work, but is 
training a game, play or work? This paper hopes to offer starting answers to these 
questions. 




Amateur and professional sportspersons, Bernard Suits proposed, are 
differentiated by their attitude towards their sport. For the amateur, competition is a 
game done for its own sake; while for the professional, it is a game, but it is one that is 
done for a further reason. This proposal captures the ordinary extension of these terms: 
professionals compete for money and status. Their sport is their livelihood, playing the 
game is their profession. But the proposal is technical: Percy, who joins the football 
team just because Gwendolyn fancies football players, is a professional on this 
definition (Suits 2014, 155). Amateurs, by contrast, compete solely, or overridingly, 
“for the love of the game” (Suits 2014, 155). It follows, Suits argues, that there is clear 
cut difference in attitude when it comes to playing the game — that is, competing in the 
sport. Amateurs and professionals do the same sport, they play the same athletic games. 
But one is playing, while the other is working. 
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Allow this clear-cut attitudinal difference to be the taken for granted starting 
point. The question this paper pursues is then: what should one say about the training 
that both amateur and professional do in preparation for competition? And, in particular, 
what should Suits say? Is the clear-cut attitudinal divide found in competition equally 
found in training? And what is the status of training? Competition is an athletic game 
which can be engaged in as play or work, but is training a game, play or work? This 
paper hopes to offer starting answers to these questions. The next section begins by 
proposing that amateurs and professionals are as divided in their attitude towards 
training as they are in their attitude towards competition. After rejecting this proposal, 
subsequent sections consider how there might be an overlap in attitude towards training 
that is nevertheless consistent with a divergent attitude towards competition. 
 
Professional and Amateur Training are Different 
In his later work, Suits (1988) differentiated between sports that are 
performances — such as diving and gymnastics — and sports that are games — such as 
athletic events, football and hockey. Training for these different categories of sport is 
different; “Performances require rehearsal, games require practice” (Suits 1988, 2). The 
focus here is sports that are games, and thereby the practice that is training for these 
competitive games.1 This practice is something that both amateurs and professionals do. 
The question is how it should be conceived, and one proposal is that there is a 
fundamental difference in the attitudes of amateurs and professionals to training. 
                                               
1 Compare Meier (1988) who holds that all sports are games, including those Suits’s classes as 
performances. 
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On this proposal, this difference in attitude follows from the different attitudes 
amateurs and professionals have to competition. For the professional, competition is not 
play insofar as it serves an instrumental purpose, which paradigmatically is generating 
income. Insofar as training is something done for the purpose of success in competition, 
it is equally an instrumental activity. And these end purposes collapse: ultimately, the 
point of training is whatever goal competition has, which, again, is paradigmatically the 
generation of income. Without this instrumental reason to enter competition, if the 
amateur does compete, they do so for the love of the game. For the amateur, 
competition is an end in itself; it is what Suits (1988, 8) calls an autotelic activity. And 
training likewise inherits this rationale. That is, while both amateur and professional 
train in order to be able to compete, the amateur also competes in order to train. While 
competition is not necessary for training, it is sufficient for it, which is to say that 
competition serves the further purpose of initiating practice for competition or training. 
Thus the amateur puts, what Suits (2014, 101) calls, a reverse English spin on the 
professional’s attitude to training. This Suits’s illustrates thus: a non-game playing 
imposter would behave like a Russian Princess in order to be taken for Anastasia, but 
the player of make-believe chooses to be Anastasia in order to behave like a Russian 
Princess. Similarly, the purpose of a professional in training is to be able to compete, 
while an amateur enters competitions in order to be able to train. For the amateur, 
training is then another autotelic activity. One directed towards competition but done for 
its own sake. 
Three worries might be raised about this proposal: two can be answered, but one 
is genuine.2 Taking these in order, first, it might seem contradictory to say, as just said 
                                               
2 A further worry is that the distinction between amateur and professional is so historically 
unhappy that it should be jettisoned completely. Thus Papineau (2017, 265) writes, “I won’t 
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of amateurs, that training is both for the purpose of competition and is an end in itself. 
Or equally that competition is both for the purpose of training and is an end in itself. 
The worry here is that if one does some activity X in order to do another activity Y, then 
one is thereby not doing X as an end in itself. This worry might be forceful in some 
cases, but it is not when X and Y are equally valued goods, and where X is done, only 
in part, because it makes Y possible. That X is done for the love of it is compatible with 
X also being done because it makes Y possible; it is incompatible only with X being 
done principally as means to Y, where this naturally follows when Y is valued more 
than X. Thus, on the present proposal, the amateur equally values both training and 
racing, and each is done for the love of it and done, in part, because it makes the other 
possible. 
Second, actual amateurs, that is those who compete but don’t earn their 
livelihood from competition, might train, just as they compete, for all sorts of purposes. 
They might train and compete to raise money for charity, to lose weight, to lower their 
blood pressure, to impress Gwendolyn and so on. So it seems idealised to say that 
amateurs do train and compete ‘for the love’ of it. This is undoubtedly so: people’s 
actual motivations for training and competing will be complex and various. But, first, I 
am working with Suits’s understanding of ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’, which only 
imperfectly tracks everyday use (and where every day use might not itself be entirely 
consistent). And if it is preferred, I could follow Suits’s (1988, 8) suggestion and ditch 
                                               
go so far as to say I reach for my gun whenever I heard the word ‘amateur’. But give me a 
crusade to keep sport pure in the name of amateur values, and I will show you a hypocritical 
campaign designed to further some selfish interest.” While I share Papineau’s sentiment, 
given that we make this distinction in practice, it needs to be philosophically explored, and 
this paper does that. 
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both terms, replacing them respectively with ‘autotelic event or activity’ and 
‘instrumental event or activity’ as and when appropriate. For simplicity, I prefer to just 
understand ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ in these ways. And, second, the proposal 
concerns essential reasons, so the person who signs up to a marathon primarily in order 
to raise money, and trains for this purpose is thereby a ‘professional’ in their attitude. 
(This is a point that I will return to in the concluding section.) 
Third, a more serious objection is that on the proposal that amateurs put a 
reverse English spin on professionals’ attitude to training, amateurs and professionals 
thereby differ in their attitude towards training in the same way that imposters and 
players of games of make-believe differ in their attitude towards role play. But this 
difference is too big a difference. Thus, it is a sentiment frequently heard expressed by 
actual professional sportspersons that they cannot believe that they are paid to do 
something they love and would do anyway. And while actual professionals have been 
put to one side, the fact that this sentiment is expressed still needs to be credited. For 
what it suggests is that the attitudes of professionals and amateurs converge when it 
comes to training. They might have different ends in competition, but they have the 
same end in training, which is preparation for competition that is at the same time 
something that is done simply ‘for the love of it’.  
The question, then, is whether this is a consistent pairing. How is it that there 
can be divergence when it comes to the game and convergence when it comes to 
practising for the game? In the next five sections, I consider five different ways of 
answering this question. The following explanations of this convergence are tendered: 
(i) training is a game; (ii) training is play; (iii) training is work; (iv) training is a utopian 
activity; and (v) training is a practice. Explanations (i) to (iv) are Suitian, while 
explanation (v) comes from Alastair MacIntyre. I reject (i) to (iii) for various connected 
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reasons, argue that (iv) is the basis of a good explanation, but then claim that this 
explanation is better delivered by (v). 
 
Training is a Game 
There are, Suits argued, four elements to a game. There is the goal, the means, 
the rules and the attitude needed to be a game player, which he called the lusory 
attitude. These elements Suits (1988, 11) assembles into the following definition. 
To play a game is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs (pre-lusory goal), 
using only means permitted by rules (lusory means), where the rules prohibit use of 
more efficient in favour of less efficient means (constitutive rules), and where such 
rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity (lusory attitude). 
And offers the following “more portable version”: “playing a game is the voluntary 
attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles” (Suits 2014, 43). The first proposal, then, is 
that there is a commonality to professional and amateur attitudes to training because 
training is itself a game; and playing the training game requires both amateur and 
professional to have the same lusory attitude towards it. 
To elaborate this idea, consider the elements of a game. The goal in training will 
vary depending on what competition the training is practice for. The end goal for an 
amateur might be merely completing a marathon without walking, while for a 
professional it might be running an Olympic, or Olympic trials, qualifying time. These 
end goals would then structure a series of intermediate training goals — say running a 
short distance without walking or a shorter distance at this pace — where in each case 
this goal would be a specific achievable state of affairs. Following Suits, the means to 
this specific achievable state of affairs might first be identified broadly. One could, say, 
achieve the goal of covering a certain distance without walking simply by driving this 
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distance, or achieve the goal of covering a certain distance at a certain pace by riding a 
bicycle. But adopting these means would defeat the purpose of training. So, the idea 
runs, these means are not permitted by the rules of the training game. To employ such 
means would thereby be to cheat at training, and so fail to train. The lusory attitude is 
then what explains the game players’ willingness to abide by these restrictions. Why 
accept limitations on means for achieving one’s goal? Answer: because only by 
following these rules does one play the game. So only by forgoing the car or bike and 
attempting to cover the distance on foot does one actually train for a marathon. This 
lusory attitude is what is common to amateurs and professionals even if their approach 
to the games they are training for ends up being quite different. 
Thus the proposal. Consider it now in more detail. The goals of training will be 
various; so much is true because the competitions people train for will be various, and 
people can have different goals in competition. One might enter a race to win it, or be 
the first across the line, while another might enter simply to participate. And there are 
different races and different games. But cutting across this variety is one training goal 
that is fixed, which is to be capable of achieving one’s competitive goals — or to be 
capable of achieving competitive success. Variety then enters because people’s 
competitive goals vary — what constitutes competitive success varies. Again, one might 
enter a race to win it, or merely participate etc.  
Two points then follow given this general cross-cutting goal of training. First, 
there will be many intermediary training goals that do not involve physical preparation. 
A Tour de France rider, for example, might want to familiarise himself with the roads 
on an Alpine stage, and there are no restrictions as to how he might do this — riding the 
course on a motorbike, viewing it from a helicopter or a virtual-reality presentation are 
all fine, for instance. So the claim that there is a restriction in means focuses on only 
one aspect of training: physical preparation for competition. Second, by and large the 
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restrictions imposed then take the form of, what Suits (2014, 94) calls, a limitation in 
principle. Suits’s example of a limitation in principle is that of choosing to climb the 
more difficult Mount Impossible over Mount Invincible or Mount Everest. As he 
imagines things, it is not possible to land a helicopter on top of Mount Impossible, so in 
choosing to climb Mount Impossible there need be no rule proscribing the more 
efficient use of a helicopter to reach the summit. Choosing to climb Mount Impossible 
is thereby comparable to choosing to be bound by certain restrictions; the goal is chosen 
just because it forces a limitation on means, where this limitation is equivalent to a rule-
based restriction because it is equally arbitrary or artificial, given that the goal itself 
need not be chosen. Similarly, taking a car or bike is not a more efficient means for 
achieving the training goal of running a certain distance without walking or running at a 
certain pace because taking the car or bike is not any means of achieving these goals 
given that these intermediary training goals are subsumed under the general cross-
cutting goal of training. It follows that there is no need for any rule to proscribe taking 
the car or bike, just as there need be no rule proscribing the use of a helicopter in 
summiting Mount Impossible. The difference between these cases, however, is that 
there is no artificiality in the training case. While the goal of climbing Mount 
Impossible need not be chosen, the general cross-cutting goal of training follows from 
choosing any particular training goal; that is, the restrictions naturally follow from the 
basic or fundamental goal of all training which is achieving capacity for competitive 
success. 
Nevertheless, even if the restrictions on training are largely a non-artificial 
consequence of the general goal of training, this is not yet to say that there are no 
proscriptive rules. Thus, and for instance, a more efficient means of achieving capacity 
for competitive success would be to use performance enhancing drugs (hereafter PEDs). 
PEDs would mark an increase in efficiency because they would make it easier to 
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achieve the intermediary training goals — covering the distance without walking or at a 
certain pace, say — and so make it easier for achieving the end training goal which is 
the achievement of capacity: the putting the sportsperson in a position to successfully 
compete. However, PEDs are proscribed and it is the presence of this rule, and any like 
it prohibiting more efficient means, that arguably makes training into a game. 
The problem with this defence of the proposal that training is a game is that the 
rule prohibiting the use of PEDs is arguable not a constitutive rule of the ‘training 
game’. Rather, it is arguably what Suits (1988, 5) calls a pre-event rule of whatever 
competitive game that the training is for.3 That is, PEDs are ruled out not by the rules of 
the ‘training game’ but by the goal that training has. This goal — capacity for 
competitive success — refers to success in a competitive game, and success in a game 
does not come by way of cheating. It follows that insofar as the pre-event rule 
proscribing PEDs is a pre-existing rule of the competitive game, then success at this 
game, which is the goal of training, requires the recognition of this rule. As such, it is 
not an ‘unnecessary obstacle’ to achieving the goal of training, erected in order to make 
a game of training. Rather, it is a necessary restriction given the goal of training.  
However, if this restriction is not imposed by a rule of training, this suggests, 
that training is not rule-bound, and so it not a game at all. This is to say that training 
rather involves, within circumstantial constraints, the selection of the most efficient 
means. Thus the logic of training would endorse the use of PEDs (and any marginal 
gain) where there is no prohibition by a pre-event rule, just as it endorses 
reconnaissance of Alpine stages in the Tour. This same point — that training involves 
the selection of the most efficient means — might then be made by reference to a doped 
Tour rider who takes the pre-lusory goal of crossing the finish line first so seriously that 
                                               
3 Meier (1985), 70 calls these auxiliary rules. 
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he does not recognize pre-event rules. In not recognizing these rules of competition, the 
cheat would happily use PEDs in training just because they offer more efficient means 
to the goal of training, which is the capacity for success in competition — now 
understood by the cheat’s excess of zeal as no more than crossing the finish line first.  
In sum, while competition is a game, training is not. It is not a game because it 
involves the selection of the most efficient means, given the circumstances, for the 
achievement of its end, which is the possession of the capacity for competitive success, 
however this itself be understood. Some other account is thereby needed of what is 
common to the training of amateur and professional.4 
 
Training is Play 
The second proposal is that for both amateur and professional, training is play, 
where play according to Suits (1977, 124) involves the “temporary reallocation to 
autotelic activities of resources primarily committed to instrumental purposes”.5 For 
present purposes, the key claim here is that play is an autotelic activity, or something 
that is done simply for the love of it, so the proposal is that training qua play is an 
autotelic activity. This proposal might be supported by two considerations. 
                                               
4 It should be noted that, as quoted, “games require practice” (Suits 1988, 2). So training will 
involve playing games. But this is a case of a game being training, rather than training being 
a game. 
5 Compare Meier ibid. who holds that in the context of sport and games, it is sufficient for play, 
and not merely necessary for it, that an activity be autotelic. And Feezell (2004) who makes 
play those autotelic activities that are voluntary and separate from ordinary life. For an 
account of autotelicity, see Schmid (2009).  
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First, competitive athletic games — that is, on Suits’s view, sports that are not 
performances — are a species of game. What identifies these games as sport, Suits 
(1988) argues is that they are games of physical skill with a wide following and a 
certain level of stability. But these elaborations aside (and I’ll come back to them later), 
competitive athletic games as games of physical skill. And such games are valuable, 
Suits (1988, 12) proposes because in playing them people “can realise in themselves 
capacities not realizable (or not readily so) in the pursuit of their ordinary activities.” He 
gives the example of running: one has few opportunities to run competitively. The odd 
occasion when one has “the good fortune to arrive tardily at a bus stop” (Suits 1988, 
12). But if one seeks this opportunity by deliberately leaving late, then one makes a 
game of it. And running is the exception: life offers no opportunities for anything like, 
say, football or golf. So competitive games are valued because they allow us to realize 
our capacities, and the first consideration is then the claim that training, which is 
practice for these games, inherits this valuation. Training, like competition, allows us to 
realize in ourselves capacities not realized in ordinary activities. Though this is not to 
say that training is an autotelic activity (or play on a Suitian account), it defines a 
constant or a general reason for training that bridges the many different particular 
reasons that people might have. Moreover, this is a reason for training that is intrinsic to 
the activity of training itself; otherwise put: it identifies an intrinsic reason for training. 
That there is an intrinsic reason for training then makes training comparable to an 
autotelic activity, or play.6 
The second supporting consideration is that the difference between amateur and 
professional with respect to competitive athletic games does not carry over to training. 
This difference, recall, can be put simply: while both play competitive games, only 
                                               
6 And it makes it play according to Schmid (2011). 
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amateurs are playing when they do so. Professionals are those “who have in view some 
further purpose which is achievable by playing the game” (Suits 2014, 154). 
Paradigmatically this is money but, as noted, it could be the affections of Gwendolyn, 
and this is what makes ‘professional’ a technical term. Professionalism also creeps in, 
Suits (1988, 9) notes, when the desire to win becomes over-riding. When it does the 
game is no longer played for the love of it, it is played for this further purpose, which is 
victory and the associated glory. So this compulsion can turn a game from play into 
something that is not play, which in Suits’s schema is work — work being activity that 
is done for a further end. Thus professionals work in playing competitive athletic 
games, while amateurs play in doing so. But, so the second consideration runs, this 
transformation of something that is by nature play into work, which marks the 
difference between amateur and professional, is not something that happens when it 
comes training. There is not the compulsion to win since training is not a game (and the 
person who ‘races’ every repetition just needs to be reminded of this). And it is 
performance in the game that is monetized, using this term broadly, not practice for it. 
So the further ends that corrupt play, as it were, are not present. 
Putting these two considerations together gives the result that both amateurs and 
professionals are playing when they train, and this is what accounts for the similarity in 
their attitudes. 
The problem with this proposal is straightforward. Even if there might be an 
element of play in training, and even if training is done, in part, simply for the love of it, 
training is nonetheless an end directed activity. Its purpose is to establish the capacity 
for successful competition, however success is understood. As such, training arguably 
falls into the category of work; it is an activity that is done for a further reason. It 
follows that its value is instrumental, measured by competitive success, or by the more 
nuanced measure of capacity for competition, that is competitiveness. This feature of 
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training makes it implausible to conceive of it simply as play even allowing the truth of 
the two supporting considerations. Training is a kind of work, and at times certainly 
feels as such, so some other account of the similarity in attitude between amateur and 
professional is needed. 
 
Training is work. 
Following on from the conclusion of the last section, the obvious third proposal 
is that for both amateur and professional, training is work. Their shared attitude towards 
training then follows from the facts that both do it for a further end, and in both cases 
this end is broadly the same. That is, both are motivated by future competitive athletic 
games and the desire to put themselves in a position to achieve competitive success, 
however this is conceived. This is work, as Suits understands it, because it is 
instrumental activity, or activity done for an end. The case of conceiving of training in 
this way has been largely made already, so I will not rehearse it. 
This conception of training as work speaks directly to one of the puzzles of 
sport, if it can be called that. This puzzle starts from the fact that training can be hard 
work, in the sense that it can be something that is difficult or arduous. Given that it can 
be this, it can then seem mysterious why anyone would do it. Why, for example, would 
you get up early, when it is still dark, put on your running gear and go out into the wet 
and cold Winter morning? The answer ‘for the love of it’ does not seem adequate 
because there is no obvious pleasure in getting out in the wet and cold and then exerting 
yourself. If this is a pleasure at all, it is not a pleasure like rolling over and enjoying the 
soft, warm duvet (or basking in the sun, or eating grapes). And any pleasure in going 
out into the frigid morning would seem less than the pleasure of simply staying in bed. 
So our reason for training seems to call for explanation in a way that our reason for 
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staying in bed, or basking in the sun, does not. One response is that of Mill to Bentham. 
Bentham observed that push-pin might be the equal of poetry in terms of the pleasure it 
gives.7 And Mill responded that we should consider the quality of the pleasure as well 
as its quantity.8 There are simple pleasures — like staying in a warm bed — and 
complex pleasures — like going running on wet, cold mornings — and the quality of a 
complex pleasure can carry more weight than its simple quantity. A problem with this 
response arises to the extent that citing a more complex pleasure can fail to capture our 
motivations. For example, take Suits’s proposal that people play games because 
ordinary life does not provide sufficient opportunities for realizing their capacities. The 
satisfaction of your desire to realize your capacities names a complex pleasure. But if 
one were to ask the imagined runner why she got out of bed to run on such a dark 
Winter’s morning, one would not get the answer because she wanted to realize her 
capacities. This is not to say that this answer is false, or that it cannot form part of an 
explanation at some level, but it is to say that it would not ordinarily form part of an 
explanation that picks up on the agent’s reasons in a way that makes sense of her 
actions. The kind of reason that our imagined runner might give would be that she was 
training for X — where ‘X’, as was said before, might be as various as her first 
marathon, which she hopes to complete without walking, or the Olympic trials 
marathon. And the point here is just that her going out into the cold morning is for 
                                               
7 “Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music 
and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish more pleasure, it is more valuable than either” 
(Bentham 1825, 206). 
8 “It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as 
quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone” (Mill 
2014, 11-12). 
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something; that is, it is an instrumental activity, or work in Suits’s sense. Her end goal 
supplies her reason, and this reason is of a kind that makes it non-mysterious why she 
got out of bed. It might be that in training for her marathon she is also realizing 
capacities that she does not otherwise have a chance to realize, but the explanation that 
this reference provides is not of the ordinary action-explanation sort. By contrast, 
conceiving of training as work is explanatory, and it makes it non-mysterious why 
people train. 
The problem with the proposal that training is work is that it does not fit with the 
other data point, which is that the amateur puts a reverse English spin on the 
professional attitude towards training. That is, the amateur competes in order to train. 
So while it is true that our imagined runner leaves her house on that cold, wet and dark 
morning — and one could add windy too — because she is training for a marathon; it is 
also true, if she is an amateur, that she is training for a marathon just so that she can get 
out of bed on mornings like this one. So the appropriate level of action explanation has 
to dig a little deeper than the reason that she is training for a marathon because there is 
no reason for doing this. The marathon is, as it were, an ‘unnecessary obstacle’, a 
barrier put in place just for the pleasure of surmounting it. It is not, as it is with the 
professional, that she can offer a further reason, which is paradigmatically financial. 
Rather, the marathon is done simply for its own sake, and by the logic of reverse 
English, training inherits this rationale. So ‘for the love of it’ must name a complex 
pleasure, something like that of realizing one’s capacities, and the action explanation 
must proceed beyond what is voiced. This is not to give to no credit to the reasons that 
are voiced, it is just to say that training cannot be merely work. It might be work in the 
sense of hard graft; and it might be work in Suits’s sense that it is goal directed. But it 
still remains true, for the amateur, that it is something that ultimately is done for its own 
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sake.9 The starting point of this paper was then that there is a substantial overlap here in 
the attitudes of amateur and professional. Professionals, all be it actual, express their 
love for their sporting activity, which is a love of training. So some other explanation is 
needed of this convergence. 
 
Training is a Utopian Activity 
Suits (2014) aims to do at least two things. It aims to provide a conceptual 
analysis of games, or an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for playing a 
game. And it aims to change how we think about games. Thus, Suits (1988, 14) 
observes that we tend to think of games as “non-serious”, which is to say as frivolous. 
But Suits (2014, 182) contends that games play a crucial role in delineating the ideal of 
existence, “a role which cannot be performed by any other activity, and without which 
an account of the ideal is either incomplete or impossible.” Suits makes this argument 
by appeal to an idea of Utopia. 
In Utopia, there are no economic needs; “the condition of man is a South Sea 
island paradise, where yachts, diamonds, racing cars, symphonic performances, 
mansions and trips around the world are as easily plucked from the environment as 
breadfruit is in Tahiti” (Suits 2014, 183). Economic work is fully automated. All 
knowledge is possessed, and developments in pharmacology mean there are “cures for 
all psychic disturbances” (Suits 2014, 183). And one should add to this characterisation 
that there is a magic bean that delivers all the health and competitive benefits of training 
without the work. The problem with Utopia is then that there is nothing that needs to be 
                                               
9 For a different account of what this amounts to than Suits’s realizing capacities, see Russell 
(2005). 
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done; and one can only bask in the sun eating grapes for so long. What is then needed to 
make life interesting is some activity that is not done for some further end, and, Suits 
(2014, 189) suggests, games fit this bill “[f]or in games we must have obstacles which 
we can strive to overcome just so that we can possess the activity as a whole, namely, 
playing the game. Game playing [then] makes it possible to retain enough effort in 
Utopia to make life worth living.” 
An immediate worry is that games are hereby being put to an end, and the most 
demanding end that there can be: to justify, or make meaningful, existence. Suits 
response to this worry is to introduce the idea of what might be called a utopian activity. 
Such an activity may have an instrumental value but it is also valued instrinsically as an 
end in itself. Here Suits (2014, 193) gives the example of John Striver who, bored with 
Utopia, decides to become a carpenter and build his own house. There is no need for 
him to do this, or any need in Utopia for house builders, so what house should Striver 
attempt to build? Given his aim is the alleviation of his boredom, one that is difficult 
enough to make the activity interesting without being so difficult as to be impossible.10 
Engaging in just this house building activity is then to play a game. It is to choose 
inefficient means to an end solely to be engaged in the activity. Thus, while game 
playing in the narrow ‘frivolous’ sense need not be the sole occupation in Utopia, game 
playing “is the essence, the ‘without which not’ of Utopia” (Suits 2014, 194). 
Utopian activities, as such, might then be characterised as those activities that 
have instrumental value, but which are valued intrinsically. Striver’s efforts result in a 
house, but he engages in house building just for the sake of it. Or to give Suits (2014, 
189) example from our sub-lunar world, a scientific researcher might value the pursuit 
                                               
10 Compare the life project of Percival Bartlebooth in Perec (1978). (For a short description of 
this see Auster (1987)). 
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of her research as a good in itself even when the results of this research are 
instrumentally valuable. Moreover, this conjunction is fairly prosaic: anyone that loves 
their job (such as actual professional athletes) will value it in this conjunctive way. And, 
so the fourth proposal goes, this is the case with training. Training is not just work, it is 
also something that is done for the love of it. So in Utopia, people would make a game 
out of training by forgoing the magic bean in the same way that Striver forgoes 
automated-house-building-services. Training is thereby a utopian activity, the kind of 
thing that would give existence a purpose in Utopia. On this proposal, the objections to 
previous proposals make good sense. For each previous proposal focussed on one aspect 
of training — they focussed either on its instrumental value, or its being valued in itself 
— when in fact the activity of training has both aspects or can be valued in both ways. 
This follows from its being a utopian activity. (Hence Suits (1977, 127) observes that 
the tennis player Tommy More “a visitor to our world from Utopia … was neither a 
professional nor an amateur, since in Utopia the distinction between the two has no 
application.”) 
This proposal is good as far as it goes. However, all it does is argue for a 
possibility. What is further needed is some account of how training exemplifies this 
possibility. Such an account can be provided, I think, by considering the social 
institution of the sport in which the training is embedded. I attempt to do this in the next 
section through appealing to Alasdair MacIntyre’s idea of a practice. 
 
Training is Part of a Practice 
Training can be, at once, both an instrumental and an autotelic activity. This 
possibility can be identified through conceiving of training as a utopian activity. But it 
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is better developed, I hope to show in this section, by situating both training and the 
competition that training is preparation for, within the sport that is being practised. 
A sport, according to Suits (1988), is a game of physical skill with a wide 
following and a certain level of stability. What is required for stability is not just that the 
sport be long-lived — Hula-hoop would be a craze even if it were long-lived — but that 
there be social institutions that sustain the sport and ensure that it is long-lived. These 
institutions have the function, Suits (1988, 13) suggests, of “teaching and training, 
coaching, research and development ... criticism ... and archivism (the compilation and 
preservation of individual performances and their statistical treatment).” None of these 
functions are strictly necessary, in the philosophical sense, but that there be some such 
sustaining social institutions is. I do not dispute the necessity of such sustaining social 
institutions but would suggest that such social institutions are necessary for precisely 
this: sustaining the sport. The sport itself, whatever it might be, should not be identified 
with these institutions, but might rather be conceived as the practice that these 
institutions sustain. The appeal here is to Alasdair MacIntyre who, just as Suits contrasts 
Hula-hoop with a sport, contrasts Tic-tac-toe with a practice; stating, “Tic-tac-toe is not 
an example of a practice … nor is throwing a football with skill; but the game of 
football is, and so is chess.” (MacIntyre 2007, 187). And MacIntyre (2007, 194) agrees 
that while “no practices can survive for any length of time unsustained by institutions”, 
such that “institutions and practices characteristically form a single causal order”, 
nevertheless institutions are not practices, “[c]hess, physics and medicine are practices; 
chess clubs, laboratories, universities and hospitals are institutions”.  
On this proposal, sport is a game of physical skill that is embedded in society in 
a way that makes it into a practice. For MacIntyre the range of practices is wide — from 
chess to football to physics and much else besides — but a practice can be defined as 
“any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative activity through 
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which good internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive 
of, that form of activity” (MacIntyre 2007, 187). The key feature of this definition, both 
for MacIntyre and current purposes, is the distinction between internal and external 
goods. This distinction largely, but importantly not exactly, maps onto Suits’s 
distinction between autotelic and instrumental activities. MacIntyre illustrates it with the 
case of teaching chess to a highly intelligent seven year who agrees to learn for the 
reward of sweets; some for playing, and some more for winning. 
Thus motivated the child plays and plays to win. Notice, however, that, so long as 
it is the candy alone which provides the child with a good reason for playing chess, 
the child has no reason not to cheat and every reason to cheat, provided he or she 
can do so successfully. But, so we may hope, there will come a time when the child 
will find in those goods specific to chess, in the achievement of a certain highly 
particular kind of analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity, a 
new set of reasons, reasons now not just for winning on a particular occasion, but 
for trying to excel in whatever way the game of chess demands. (MacIntyre 2007, 
188) 
In this case, sweets are the external good. And when the child plays chess in order to get 
this reward, playing chess is an instrumental activity; and, in Suits’s terms, the child is a 
professional player. The goods internal to the practice are those that cannot be had in 
any other way than by participating in the practice, (and the claim here is metaphysical 
and not refuted if playing chess is the child’s only source of sweets). These are the 
goods that the child comes to enjoy when she comes to play chess “for the love of the 
game” (Suits 2014, 155); when playing chess becomes an autotelic activity, and the 
child, in Suits’s terms is an amateur player. Internal goods are then internal for three 
reasons. Because they can only be specified by reference to a practice. Because they can 
only be recognized by those with the experience of participating in the practice. And 
because they are the product of trying to excel at the practice. 
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The achievement of these internal goods — a result of excelling to whatever 
degree — is then pleasurable. “Someone who achieves excellence in a practice, who 
plays chess or football well … characteristically enjoys his achievement and his activity 
in achieving” (MacIntyre 2007, 197). This is not to identify a further good, which would 
then threaten to make excelling at the practice instrumental, or valued to the extent that 
it resulted in pleasure. Rather, MacIntyre proposes an “Aristotelian view of pleasure”: 
“the enjoyment of the activity and the enjoyment of achievement are not the ends at 
which the agent aims, but the enjoyment supervenes upon the successful activity in such 
a way that the activity achieved and the activity enjoyed are one and the same state” 
(MacIntyre 2007, 197). So there is a pleasure associated with doing something for the 
love of it, but one doesn’t do that thing for this pleasure, one does it for the love of it 
and the pleasure lies in doing that.  
This conception of practices and the goods internal to them, can then explain the 
common attitude of amateurs and professionals to training. Their training might serve 
different ends but in training they are practising the same sport and so both enjoy the 
goods internal to this sport as practice. The enjoyment of these internal goods is that 
associated with training being, in Suits’s terms, an autotelic activity. And this remains 
the case even if the purpose of training is for some further, instrumental, end. At this 
juncture a couple of clarifications are needed. First, excelling at a practice does not 
mean being excellent at it. A poor chess player and slow runner can still take pleasure in 
chess and running. Rather excelling at a practice means having an excellent grasp of the 
goods internal to the practice. Excellence in a practice is ordinarily sufficient for such a 
grasp, but it is not necessary for it. Second, this will mean that there will be some 
learning period when a grasp of the goods internal to the practice is still emerging and 
the balance of reasons for training are instrumental, and training is thereby work. But 
once training is viewed as part of a practice it can never merely be work, and there will 
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always be some further (internal or autotelic) value to it, even if this is imperfectly 
grasped. Moreover, any instrumental balance of reasons will only characterize an 
occasion of training, but practices need to be viewed holistically. One occasion of 
training needs to be set alongside others, the end goal and much else besides. To grasp 
the practice is then to see the pleasure in the round.11  
Moreover, conceiving of training as (an essential part of) a practice allows an 
explanation of how there can be an overlap in sport-specific attitudes that is more 
substantial than amateurs and professionals merely sharing a view of training. 
MacIntyre uses the idea of a practice to define what virtues are: “[a] virtue is an 
acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to 
achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively 
prevents us from achieving any such goods” (MacIntyre 2007, 191). Given this 
characterisation, he identifies certain core virtues necessary for any practice. For 
example, any practice will involve standards of excellence, and to enter into the practice 
is to accept these standards; “[i]f, on starting to play baseball, I do not accept that others 
know better than I when to throw a fast ball and when not, I will never learn to 
appreciate good pitching let alone to pitch” (MacIntyre 2007, 190). Recognizing these 
standards of excellence then requires that one give credit where credit is due. Thus 
justice is a core virtue. But in addition to these core virtues, specific practices will 
require, and so cultivate, specific virtues. And this is to return to the subject who goes 
                                               
11 For such an apprentice practitioner, training (or chess for MacIntyre’s intelligent seven year 
old), might then be classified as enjoyable work, “[They] enter the work activity primarily 
for the external objective, but something else that is good (or even better) also comes along. 
Therefore, the doing, the pursuing, the process, turns out to be enjoyable as well”. 
(Kretchmar, Dyreson, Llewellyn and Gleaves 2017, 32). 
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out into the cold wet morning. Excelling at the practice that is running can require that 
human quality — perhaps resolve — that enables this. Thus training will cultivate 
certain virtues, which might include resolve (getting out in the cold wet morning); 
perseverance (finishing something that is physically demanding); good judgement 
(knowing when to stop), and so on. Moreover, insofar as the practice involves physical 
games, some of these virtues should be physical virtues or virtues anchored in this 
physicality. This set of virtues, whatever it might be and here the specifics do not 
matter, will be constant across the amateur and professional for it will be part of the 
identity of the practice that both participate in. That there should then be a substantial 
overlap in sport-specific attitudes also follows from this. 
 
Revisiting the Amateur-Professional Distinction 
This paper started from Suits’s distinction between amateur and professional 
attitudes to competition. The professional, Suits proposes, competes — that is, plays 
athletic games — for a further reason, which is paradigmatically money and status; 
whereas the amateur competes for the love of the game. Accepting this distinction, the 
paper then focused on professional and amateur attitudes towards training, which is 
preparation for competition. The obvious initial thought is that the divergence in attitude 
to competition carries over and sustains a divergence in attitude towards training. That 
is, the professional trains simply to compete successfully, so training is simply a further 
instrumental activity. Whereas the amateur puts a reverse English spin on this and 
enters competition in order to enjoy training, so both are done as autotelic activities. 
However, this simple extension doesn’t chime with the attitudes that actual 
professionals express: while it is true that these train to be successful in competition, 
they also train — that is, practice the game — for the love of it. The question is then 
 24 
how to make sense of this conjunction; that is, how to accept that professionals and 
amateurs differ in their attitudes towards competition but allow that they can have 
similar attitudes towards training for competition. 
In trying to answer this question, the paper then investigated various explanatory 
strategies for showing consistency before settling on the proposal that training should be 
conceived not merely as practice for competition but as part of the practice that is the 
sport competitively engaged in. Appeal to the idea of a practice also shows that there is 
something uncomfortably technical about Suits’s understanding of ‘amateur’ and 
‘professional’ (and here I return to a worry raised in section one). According to Suits’s 
definition, a professional is someone who competes for a further reason. So Percy, who 
signs up to run a marathon in order to impress Gwendolyn, is a professional. More 
realistically those who sign up to run a marathon in order to lose weight, to lower their 
blood pressure, or raise money for charity are equally professionals. Of the tens of 
thousands of people who fill the mass starts at big city marathons many of these are 
running for such further reasons, making this mass of runners professionals. That there 
is something wrong here might then be shown by considering three archetype entrants 
to such a big city marathon. The first is Wilson Kipchoge, a Kenyan elite who competes 
for the prize money. The second is Alf Tupper an amateur club runner who has run 
numerous marathons before but never this big city marathon and is here for the love of 
the game. The third is Charity Blossom who has never run prior to signing up for this 
marathon in order to raise money for charity.12 On Suits’s proposal Charity Blossom 
should be grouped with Wilson Kipchoge as a professional and opposed to Alf Tupper 
who is the only amateur in the group. Appeal to the idea of sport as a practice allows, I 
suggest, a more natural grouping, which is to pair Kipchoge with Tupper: both have 
                                               
12 See Pike (2013). 
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their personal histories and attitudes shaped by this practice that is training for and 
competing in running events. By contrast, Charity Blossom, to the extent that she is new 
to running and is doing the marathon only to raise money, is like MacIntyre’s chess 
pupil: she has not yet been initiated into the practice, and so is motivated by external 
goods, rather than the goods internal to the practice. This is not to make an invidious 
contrast — that would require a further step: a contrastive justification of the goodness 
of the practice — it is rather to suggest a different definition of the amateur and 
professional. On this definition, a professional is simply someone who makes a 
profession out of a practice. This entails a concern with external goods but does not 
entail a neglect of internal ones. By contrast, an amateur is a non-professional 
practitioner; and Suits’s pseudo-professionals — Percy and Charity Blossom — are 
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